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ABSTRACT: This review uses the excellent recent anthology, What Is Enough: 
Sufficiency, Justice, and Health, edited by Carina Fourie and Annette Rid, as a 
springboard for a discussion of a little-noticed problem for sufficientarian principles 
governing the distribution of health or health care.  All sufficientarian principles must 
be assigned a scope: a set of individuals among who are to be brought up to the level 
of sufficiency.  When it comes to health and health care, sufficientarians will, rightly, 
want to reject broad scopes, as they will entail that we are accountable for securing 
health care for, e.g., wild animals.  Unfortunately, any narrow scope will seem 
morally arbitrary, as it will imply that among all the individuals who could benefit 
from health care we are obligated to provide it only to some of them.  But I suggest 
here that such arbitrariness is no problem for narrow-scope sufficientarianism in 
health or health care as long as the principle is cast as a non-fundamental principle of 
public policy, as opposed to a fundamental moral principle. 
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 In her enormously helpful first contribution to What Is Enough: 
Sufficiency, Justice, and Health, Carina Fourie makes a distinction between 
instrumental and non-instrumental defenses of sufficientarianism (2017, 16).  One 
offers an instrumental defense of a sufficientarian distribution of some good if one 
advocates it on the basis that that distribution is required by some non-sufficientarian 
moral principle.  All other defenses of sufficientarian distributions are non-
instrumental.1 
 In this article I use this distinction as a jumping-off point for exploring the 
prospects for substantiating sufficientarianism as the, or at least a, valid principle 
                                                 
1 This isn’t quite how Fourie makes out the distinction—her distinction is in kinds of principle whereas 
mine is in kinds of defense of principle—but it is certainly in the spirit of Fourie’s distinction. 
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governing the distribution of health or health care, in light of the recent entries to that 
debate collected in the excellent What Is Enough.  My conclusion will be twofold: 1) 
the prospects for a successful non-instrumental defense of sufficientarianism in health 
or health care (SHHC) are dim.  2) SHHC supporters can turn this fact to their 
advantage. 
 I begin by pointing out that no distributive principle is complete until its 
scope has been specified; where the ‘scope’ of a distributive principle is the set of 
individuals among whom the distribution shall (ideally) hold.  This is something none 
of the chapters in What Is Enough addresses, so I’ll strike out on my own for now 
before coming back to What Is Enough. 
 The first thing to note is that there is a conceptual limit to the scope of a 
principle of SHHC: the individuals that appear in the scope must be such that it makes 
conceptual sense to speak of their health (or lack thereof) or of them receiving health 
care.  This limit still leaves us with a potentially very wide scope; plants would 
qualify.2 
 Clearly, though, no one is going to offer a non-instrumental argument for a 
principle of sufficiency in health or health care if its scope is specified so as to include 
plants, as this would be to argue that it matters morally in itself whether we act so as 
to guarantee that plants have sufficient health or health care.  Granted, some 
philosophers believe that plants matter morally, but none have argued that there are 
anything but the most modest moral constraints on our treatment of them.  And this 
version of SHHC would indeed impose non-modest constraints on our treatment of 
                                                 
2 We do, after all, speak of plants as being diseased. 
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plants—it would deem it wrong or at least wrong making for us to fail to guarantee 
them a certain level of health or health care.3  
 Narrowing the scope somewhat we arrive a version of SHHC with a scope 
that includes all and only animals.  Again, however, while there are philosophers who 
believe that non-human animals matter morally, there are none who accept a moral 
constraint on our treatment of them that is as strict as the version of SHHC under 
consideration here.  Animal-friendly versions of consequentialism, such as Singer’s 
utilitarianism, impose no constraints at all on our treatment of non-human animals, 
since consequentialism requires the rejection of constraints per se.  Meanwhile, the 
most animal-friendly versions of non-consequentialism, Tom Regan’s (1983) and 
Gary Francione’s (2008) theories of animal rights, are used by their authors solely to 
establish negative constraints on our treatment of animals, whereas SHHC with the 
scope we’re currently considering would impose a positive constraint.   
 What should be apparent so far is that those who want to argue for SHHC 
should hope that they can find a principled way of defending a narrow scope for their 
principle, where by ‘narrow’ I simply mean narrower than the two scopes already 
discussed.  Can they?  As mentioned already, none of the entries to What is Health 
tackle the scope question, but we can nevertheless ask whether an answer is implicit 
anywhere in those chapters. 
 In his entry Robert Huseby discusses the problem of expensive tastes 
(2017, 72-3).  Assume for now that the currency of sufficientarianism is objective 
                                                 
3 Here I have in mind only deontic versions of SHHC—i.e. versions that say something about what is 
wrong, impermissible, contrary to duty or obligation, etc.  This is to be contrasted with axiological 
sufficientarianism, which Iwao Hirose (2017) explores in his contribution to What Is Enough.  My 
view about axiological SHHC, briefly, is (1) that there are scope-related problems for non-instrumental 
defenses of it, but (2) that the axiological sufficientarian’s best strategy for coping with the scope 
challenge is quite different from the deontic sufficientarian’s best coping strategy.  Because of this, 
what I say here about deontic sufficientarianism is not intended to apply mutatis mutandis to 
axiological sufficientarianism. 
 4 
well-being.  That being the case, the problem of expensive tastes is that some 
individuals require many more resources to be brought up to a certain level of 
objective well-being than do others.  If it’s true, as I think it is, that plants and animals 
are congenitally incapable of anything close to the level of objective well-being of 
which the average human is capable, this would seem to make it the case that to be a 
plant or an animal is to have expensive tastes ipso facto.  Perhaps we could then 
exclude plants and animals from the scope of sufficientarianism on grounds of having 
expensive tastes.  (Huseby himself holds that those with expensive tastes should be 
dealt with separately from those who do not.)   
 Suppose instead that we claim, with Huseby, that the proper currency of 
sufficientarianism is subjective contentment, which is a certain satisfaction with one’s 
life.  Since plants and animals aren’t self-aware in the way that would be necessary to 
have contentment, Huseby’s sufficientarianism excludes them (and some severely 
cognitively disabled humans) from its scope right from the start.   
 Problem solved?  Hardly.  Maybe it’s true that animals should be excluded 
from the scope of sufficientarianism, but surely it’s not because of the problem of 
expensive tastes nor because they cannot experience contentment.  The fact that 
animals cannot experience contentment seems like a reason to reconsider contentment 
as the currency of sufficientarianism, and the fact that animals are congenitally 
incapable of reaching levels of objective well-being that typical humans can reach 
seems like a reason to insist on multiple thresholds, one for each kind of being; 
neither fact seems like a justification for excluding plants an animals from the scope 
of sufficientarianism.  Note, further, that the idea of making thresholds relative to 
capacity for well being, taken to its limit, would require a unique threshold for each 
individual in the scope.  This would constitute an abandonment of, as opposed to an 
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amendment to, sufficientarianism.  The idea behind sufficientarianism is that in spite 
of our differences we should all be brought up to some unique level. 
 What a sufficientarian may well want, at this point, is a way of defending a 
less extreme version of the multiple thresholds view.  One possibility is a version of 
sufficientarianism on which a different threshold is set for each species.  And one way 
of defending this view might involve rejecting my just-stated claim that plants and 
animals are congenitally incapable of anything close to the level of objective well-
being of which the average human is capable.  One might propose, instead, that each 
species has its own way of flourishing and that therefore inter-species comparisons in 
well-being are incoherent.  Martha Nussbaum may well be an advocate of this view, 
as she holds that there is a distinctly human way of flourishing (2006, 179-95) but 
maintains that animals flourish too (2006, 346-9). 
 Conveniently enough for us, Nussbaum is, as various contributors to What 
Is Enough point out, a sufficientarian.  Indeed, Ram-Tiktin (2017) and Mitchell et al. 
(2017), in their respective sympathetic discussions of sufficientarianism in health and 
health care, each draw on Nussbaum’s capabilities approach.   
 I admit that if Nussbaum were right that there is a way of flourishing 
unique to each species and that each individual is capable of flourishing only in its 
species-typical way, then sufficientarians would have a principled way of answering 
the scope question—specifically, that they would have a principled way of arguing for 
multiple species-specific scopes and a different sufficiency threshold for each such 
scope.  But we cannot accept this view while also accepting that flourishing is the 
proper currency of sufficientarian morality.  Nussbaum’s view about flourishing has 
the implication, which she admits, that some humans, including some sentient 
humans, cannot flourish (2006, 187; 2011, 31).  It is clear, however, that any 
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individual that is sentient has a well-being, in which case Nussbaum must admit that 
some individuals with a well-being cannot flourish.  That being the case, one would 
think that moral questions would apply to all individuals with a well-being as opposed 
to just those individuals that can flourish.  So it’s not that a principle of sufficiency-
of-flourishing, with a different scope for each species, couldn’t be valid; rather, it’s 
that it would fail to answer some important questions, such as what we owe to the 
sentient humans who cannot flourish.  Granted, some sufficientarians, including Fleck 
(2017) in his contribution to What Is Enough, are at pains to emphasize that 
sufficientarianism could be just one element of a pluralistic moral view, in which case 
it would be unreasonable to demand that it answer all the important questions.  But it 
is hard to believe that the question of what we owe to some individuals vis à vis their 
well-being should be addressed separately from the question of what we other to other 
individuals vis à vis their well-being on the grounds that the members of one set are 
capable of achieving species-specific flourishing while the members of the other set 
are not. 
 We have been asking whether any of the chapters in What Is Enough 
provide the basis for a principled argument for ascribing a narrow scope to SHHC.  
Now consider the following two passages from the book: 
 
In all modern societies, people disagree about how to distribute the benefits and burdens 
that arise from their mutual cooperation […].  Theories of distributive justice seek to 
elucidate such disagreements by establishing principles pointing out the just manner of 
distributing these benefits and burdens.  One such family of theories claims that justice 
involves ensuring that everyone has enough—so-called theories of sufficiency… 
(Axelsen and Nielson 2017, 101, emphasis in the original) 
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Justice is a political concept that describes the moral conduct of the basic institutions of a 
state….A just pattern of distribution of health care services is sufficiency… (Ram-Tiktin 
2017, 145-6) 
 
Both of these passages convey the idea that sufficientarianism is supposed to be a 
principle of (distributive) justice, specifically, and that ‘(distributive) justice’ denotes 
a certain subject matter, namely questions of political morality or—what I take it is 
supposed to be the same thing—moral questions arising from our cooperative 
activities. 
 If that is what sufficientarianism is supposed to be, then the prospects for 
giving a principled defense of a narrow scope for one’s sufficientarian principle are 
suddenly brighter.  Suppose it could be established that only humans take part in 
cooperative activities with humans.  Or suppose it could be established that only 
domesticated animals and humans take part in cooperative activities with humans, as 
Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka (2011) argue in their book Zoopolis.  Establishing 
either of these claims would mean establishing—to put it inexcusably crudely—that 
only humans, or only humans and domesticated animals, matter politically.  The 
plausibility of that claim—and the corresponding implausibility of the claim that only 
humans, or only humans and domesticated animals, matter morally—explains why 
defending SHHC as a political principle as opposed to as a moral principle raises the 
odds of being able to offer a sound defense of attaching a narrow scope to that 
principle. 
 Having established that only humans, or only humans and domesticated 
animals, take part in cooperative activities with humans, the next step would be to 
establish, further, that only those individuals are in the demos—i.e. the set of 
individuals whose interests and preferences ought to determine the contours of the 
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basic social and political institutions that humans have set up.  From this it would 
seem to follow easily that our health care institutions should be designed to serve the 
interests and preferences of only humans or only humans and domesticated animals.  
Therefore, if it could be established that SHHC is the morally privileged 
understanding of how to respect individuals’ interests and preferences in the arena of 
health and health care, it could then be established that that principle has a narrow 
scope—a scope including only humans or only humans and domesticated animals.   
 Now the crucial point: This kind of defense of SHHC would count as an 
instrumental defense.  One would be arguing, with respect to the given sufficientarian 
principle of health or health care, that upholding it is indirectly required by the 
principle requiring that society’s basic institutions be structured to serve the interests 
and preferences of the members of the demos. 
 I contend that this is the only kind of defense of SHHC that has any 
prospect of success.  Briefly, my argument runs like this: Versions of SHHC with a 
broad scope (i.e. ones that include at least all animals) are so counterintuitive as to not 
merit our attention.  Meanwhile, versions of SHHC with a narrow scope face an 
arbitrariness worry: What justifies the narrow scope?  The only viable way of 
rendering a narrow scope non-arbitrary is by making one’s preferred version of 
SHHC a political principle and arguing that it follows from the principle requiring 
that society’s basic institutions be structured to serve the interests and preferences of 
the members of the demos.  
 The fact that the only viable defenses of SHHC are instrumental is quite 
good news for sufficientarians in one way.  (I’m not arguing that it’s good news 
overall.)  It relieves sufficientarians of the burden of identifying a version of 
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sufficientarianism in health/health care that isn’t drastically counterintuitive.  This is a 
big deal, as one comes away from What Is Enough with an acute appreciation for just 
how deep the counterintuitive implications problem is for sufficientarianism per se.  
The book’s contributors, most of whom are sympathetic to sufficientarianism, are 
admirably forthright about these problems, especially the authors of the chapters in 
Part II of the book.4  For instance, sufficientarianism allegedly implies that… 
- …“[f]or any population with negative well-being (e.g., tormented lives), there 
is a population with positive well-being that is worse, other things being 
equal” (Hirose 2017, 66), and… 
- …the benefits realized for large numbers of people by the presence of a good 
road network are outweighed, morally speaking, by the risks of severe injury 
and death to those who would construct the road (Huseby 2017, 77), and… 
- …we should sometimes prioritize benefits to those who are just below the 
sufficiency threshold over benefits to those who fall farther below that 
threshold (Shields 2017, 93). 
 The usual way of fixing a principle that has drastically counterintuitive 
implications is to insert qualifications, exceptions, sub-clauses, etc.  This, of course, 
undermines one’s claim to have identified a genuine moral principle—i.e. something 
that is morally important in and of itself.  But once sufficientarians in health/health 
care give up on the goal of offering a non-instrumental defense of that principle, they 
suddenly have two compelling ways of answering detractors who point up the 
counterintuitive implications of their principle. 
                                                 
4 Although Part II is helpful in this regard, it is, nevertheless, overall the weakest Part of the book.  The 
chapters in this Part are, generally speaking, too quick with their arguments. 
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 First strategy: gerrymander away!  Essentially SHHC supporters can and 
should reconceive themselves as doing public policy work—i.e. crafting a version of 
sufficientarianism in health/health care that is workable, sensible, and worthy of being 
approved of through the democratic process.  (Though see Menzel’s (2017) and 
Fleck’s (2017) contributions to What is Health, each of which is skeptical as to 
whether SHHC is determinate enough to guide real-world health policy decisions.) 
 Second strategy: companions-in-guilt.  SHHC supporters can argue that it’s 
no strike against their principle if it delivers counterintuitive case-specific 
implications; specifically, they can insist that it is an inevitable feature of large, 
bureaucratic democracies that they adopt principles that give odd results in certain 
cases.  Consider, for instance, the minimum drinking age.  At what age a person 
should be permitted to consume alcohol depends on that particular person’s qualities, 
especially the pace at which he/she matures.  However, in large societies we have 
little choice but to just pick one age for everyone.  That one age, whatever it is, will 
deliver counterintuitive results in many cases.  With respect to some people it will 
deem them eligible to drink when really the person ought not to be eligible, while in 
other cases it will deem someone ineligible to drink when that person should in fact 
be eligible.  These counterintuitive results do not, however, on anyone’s 
understanding of public policy, constitute an argument against the minimum drinking 
age in question.  The only way to argue against a particular minimum drinking age is 
to show that there’s some other minimum drinking age that gets fewer, or fewer 
egregious, counterintuitive results.  Likewise, I am suggesting that if we frame SHHC 
as a principle of public policy then that automatically renders less forceful all 
objections to it based on its counterintuitive implications.  
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     * * * 
In putting together What Is Enough, the editors Carina Fourie and Annette Rid have 
done a magnificent service to scholarship in both sufficientarianism, the ethics of 
health and health care distribution, and of course the overlap of those two disciplines.  
Given the immediate appeal of sufficientarian approaches to the distribution of health 
and health care, a book-length treatment of the subject was entirely called for.  In 
What Is Enough, Fourie and Rid have amassed novel contributions by nearly all the 
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